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In this paper we introduce a system of kinetic equations describing an exchange market consisting
of two populations of agents (dealers and speculators) expressing the same preferences for two
goods, but applying different strategies in their exchanges. Similarly to the model proposed in
[12], we describe the trading of the goods by means of some fundamental rules in price theory, in
particular by using Cobb-Douglas utility functions for the exchange. The strategy of the speculators
is to recover maximal utility from the trade by suitably acting on the percentage of goods which
are exchanged. This microscopic description leads to a system of linear Boltzmann-type equations
for the probability distributions of the goods on the two populations, in which the post-interaction
variables depend from the pre-interaction ones in terms of the mean quantities of the goods present
in the market. In this case, it is shown analytically that the strategy of the speculators can drive
the price of the two goods towards a zone in which there is a marked utility for their group. Also,
according to [12], the general system of nonlinear kinetic equations of Boltzmann type for the
probability distributions of the goods on the two populations is described in details. Numerical
experiments then show how the policy of speculators can modify the final price of goods in this
nonlinear setting.
PACS numbers: 89.65.Gh, 05.20.Dd, 05.10.-a
I. INTRODUCTION
In recent years, there has been an increasing interest
in developing kinetic models able to describe price for-
mation in a multi-agent society, by resorting to meth-
ods typical of statistical mechanics [1, 2]. In [3] Cordier,
Pareschi and Piatecki introduce a kinetic description of
the behavior of a simple financial market consisting of
a population of agents where each agent can choose to
invest between a stock and a bond. In this case, the vari-
ation of density is derived starting from the microscopic
model for price formation introduced in [4, 5], usually
known as Levy–Levy–Solomon model. The kinetic model
proposed in [3] attempts to join to simple financial rules
a kinetic equation of Boltzmann type, able to describe a
complex behavior that could then mimic the market and
explain the price formation mechanism.
A further example of coupling wealth with behavioral
aspects has been proposed in [6]. This research studies
a relatively simple kinetic model for a financial market
characterized by a single stock or good and an interplay
between two different trader populations, chartists and
fundamentalists, which determine the price dynamics of
the stock. The model has been inspired by the micro-
scopic Lux–Marchesi model [7, 8]. The financial rules
depends here from the opinion of traders through a ki-
netic model of opinion formation recently introduced in
[9]. A related model has been developed in [10], by allow-
ing the opinion variable, which is mainly responsible of
the trading, to be strictly connected to price acceleration.
∗Electronic address: carlo.brugna@gmail.com
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Also, the importance of the personal knowledge of
agents has been recently investigated in [11], in order
to outline how wealth inequality could depend on knowl-
edge distribution in a population.
In a recent paper, driven by the assumption that peo-
ple trades to improve its utility, we coupled the meth-
ods of statistical mechanics and kinetic theory with some
principle of price theory in microeconomics [12], consid-
ering binary interactions following the rule furnished by
the Edgeworth box [13], which is frequently used in gen-
eral equilibrium theory. Edgeworth box can fruitfully be
applied in presence of an agent-based system in which
agents possess a finite number of goods of n ≥ 2 different
types. Inspired by this mechanism of increasing utility
and competitive equilibrium, in [12] was introduced and
studied a kinetic equation of Boltzmann type for the evo-
lution of the distribution density of the quantities of two
goods in a system of agents. The exchange rule based
on the Edgeworth box idea leads to a highly nonlinear
binary interaction, which is difficult to handle, if not nu-
merically.
For this reason, in [12] was considered a suitable linear
Boltzmann equation, obtained by allowing the agent to
interact (according to Edgeworth box), simultaneously
with a sufficiently high number of agents in the market.
For this model, it was shown that this linear equation has
a unique solution, and the steady states are concentrated
along a well-defined line (the price line).
Motivated by the interesting outcomes of the kinetic
model based on binary trades driven by the Edgeworth
box exchange, and taking into account the intrinsic inter-
est of studying different types of populations which be-
have differently with the aim of getting maximum utility
[6–8, 11], in what follows we will introduce and discuss a
kinetic description of a multi-agent system composed by
two populations which interact according to the principle
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2to get maximum utility, but allowing one of the two pop-
ulations to exchange goods, by using only a part of them
in the cross exchange, with the aim of getting a better
profit from this strategy. In analogy with Lux-Marchesi
description [7, 8] we will define this population as the
population of speculators, by leaving the name of dealers
to the other one.
Applying simple principles of micro–economy [14], we
first derive in Section III a linear system of kinetic equa-
tions of Boltzmann type, which describes the evolution
of the quantities of goods in the two populations. It is
shown that the evolution in time of the mean price obeys
a non linear law, which in some cases can be explicitly
given, to show that the speculators can effectively obtain
a net wealth gain from their strategy. Then, in Section IV
we will introduce a system of nonlinear kinetic equations,
similar to the one considered in [12], which is able do de-
scribe the action of a group of speculators in a market of
dealers. Numerical experiments, performed in Section V,
enlighten the possible outcomes of the various strategies.
II. THE BASIC MODEL
As discussed in the introduction, most of the existing
kinetic models for wealth distribution are based on rigid
assumptions which, if on one hand can be shared, from
the other hand are not deeply related to economic prin-
ciples, like price theory [15]. The aim of this Section is
to introduce a framework for trades, which is derived di-
rectly from the basic principles of economy [14] (cf. also
[4]).
Individuals exchange goods. The benefits they receive
depend on how much they exchange and on what terms.
Price theory tries to give an answer to this fundamental
question.
For simplicity, let us start by considering a market
with a number N of agents which possess goods of two
different types, we denote by X and Y . At the start-
ing time, agents (indexed by k) possess certain amounts
xk = xk(0) of good X and yk = yk(0) of good Y . While it
is clear that xk and yk belong to N+, to avoid inessential
difficulties, and without loss of generality, we will always
consider these numbers as positive real numbers. The to-
tal number of each good in the disposal of agents is given
by
N∑
k=1
xk = Mx,
N∑
k=1
yk = My. (2.1)
We assume moreover that the marked is closed, so that
the total quantity of goods to be exchanged remains fixed
in time. At fixed intervals of time of length ∆t, agents
exchange parts of their goods following a certain strat-
egy. In view of these exchanges, agents hold at times t
amounts of good X and Y , respectively denoted by xk(t)
and yk(t). By virtue of (2.1), for each time t ≥ ∆t
N∑
k=1
xk(t) = Mx,
N∑
k=1
yk(t) = My. (2.2)
By fixing the price in time of one of the two goods, say
X, equal to unity, and denoting by P (t) > 0 the price of
the second good Y , at each time t ≥ ∆t any agent has a
wealth wk(t) given by
wk(t) = xk(t−) + P (t)yk(t−). (2.3)
In (2.3) t− = t−∆t denotes the last exchange time. The
same notation will be used in the rest of the paper. At
any subsequent time, agents determine fractions of their
wealths, say x, to allocate the good X, with the reminder
allocated to the good Y . In order to give a meaning to
the reasons of this trading, it is classical to assume that
agent’s behavior is driven by a utility function. One of
the most popular of these functions is the Cobb-Douglas
utility function
U(x) = xα(wk(t)− x)β , α+ β = 1. (2.4)
Each agent will tend to maximize its utility by trading.
The values α and β are linked to the preferences that
the agent assigns to the two goods. If α > β, the agent
prefers to possess goods of the first type (numbered by
x). The choice α = β = 1/2 clearly means that the two
goods are equally important for A. The maximization of
(2.4) updates the quantities of goods to
xk(t) = αwk(t); P (t)yk(t) = βwk(t). (2.5)
The value of the unknown price P (t) can be easily deter-
mined from the values of the variables at time t−∆t by
resorting to the constraint (2.2). Indeed it holds
N∑
k=1
αwk(t) = Mx;
N∑
k=1
βwk(t) = Pk(t)My. (2.6)
Hence, solving for P (t) we obtain the (fixed in time) price
P (t) = P =
βMx
αMy
. (2.7)
As expected, the (relative) price (2.7) of the good Y is
directly proportional to its preference value β, and in-
versely proportional to the quantity My of goods of type
Y present in the closed marked. Substituting the expres-
sion for P (t) back into (2.5) leads to the new quantities
of goods
xk(t) = xk(t−) + β
(
Mx
My
yk(t−)− xk(t−)
)
yk(t) = yk(t−) + α
(
My
Mx
xk(t−)− yk(t−)
)
.
(2.8)
This very simple mechanism of exchange can be eas-
ily generalized to different groups of traders, which can
3adopt different strategies. The simplest of these general-
izations is to consider a market composed by two groups
of agents, say A and B, with fixed numbers NA and NB
of agents belonging to the groups A and B. As in the
previous case, agents of both groups possess goods of two
different types X and Y . At the starting time, agents of
the group A possess certain amounts xk = xk(0) of good
X and yk = yk(0) of good Y , and the total number of
each good in the disposal of agents of group A is given
by
NA∑
k=1
xk = Mx,
NA∑
k=1
yk = My. (2.9)
Likewise, agents of the group B possess certain amounts
x˜k = x˜k(0) of good X and y˜k = y˜k(0) of good Y , and
the total number of each good in the disposal of agents
of group B is given by
NB∑
k=1
x˜k = mx,
NB∑
k=1
y˜k = my. (2.10)
By assuming that the marked is closed, the total quantity
of goods at disposal of the two groups is conserved in
time. However, since agents of the two groups interact
on the same market, the total number of goods in each
population can change with time. Therefore at time t ≥
∆t
NA∑
k=1
xk(t) = Mx(t),
NA∑
k=1
yk(t) = My(t), (2.11)
and
NB∑
k=1
x˜k(t) = mx(t),
NB∑
k=1
y˜k = my(t). (2.12)
The conservation of goods of type X and Y then implies
Mx(t) +mx(t) = Mx +mx, My(t) +my(t) = My +my
(2.13)
at any subsequent time t ≥ ∆t. At integer times t ≥ ∆t,
agents of exchange parts of their goods. Agents of group
A, the dealers, follows the previous strategy. Agents of
group B, the speculators, follows a different strategy,
essentially based on saving. While possessing amounts
(x˜k(t−), y˜k(t−)) of goods, they exchange on the market
only a part (λxx˜k(t−), λy y˜k(t−)) of their goods, where
0 < λx, λy < 1 are fixed constants. Consequently, the
wealth of the k-th speculator, say w˜k(t) involved in the
exchange is
w˜k(t) = λxxk(t−) + P (t)λyyk(t−). (2.14)
Hence, in presence of this saving policy, the total quan-
tity of goods to be exchanged does not coincide with the
total (fixed) number of goods available in the market,
given by the sum of the quantities (2.9) and (2.10). The
saving policy of speculators introduces the (time depen-
dent) constraints
NA∑
k=1
αwk(t) +
NB∑
k=1
αw˜k(t) = Mx(t−) + λxmx(t−),
NA∑
k=1
βwk(t) +
NB∑
k=1
βw˜k(t) = P (t)(My(t−) + λymy(t−)),
(2.15)
that express the effective quantities of goods present in
the market at time t− 1. Proceeding as before, agents of
group A update their goods as in (2.5). However, using
the new constraints (2.15) gives the time-dependent price
P (t) =
β(Mx(t−) + λxmx(t−))
α(My(t−) + λymy(t−))
. (2.16)
Substituting the expression for P (t) back into (2.3) leads
for dealers to the new quantities of goods
xk(t) =xk(t−)+
+β
(
Mx(t−) + λxmx(t−)
My(t−) + λymy(t−)
yk(t−)− xk(t−)
)
yk(t) =yk(t−)+
+α
(
My(t−) + λymy(t−)
Mx(t−) + λxmx(t−)
xk(t−)− yk(t−)
)
.
(2.17)
Likewise, speculators update their quantities of goods by
x˜k(t) =x˜k(t−)+
+β
(
Mx(t−) + λxmx(t−)
My(t−) + λymy(t−)
λy y˜k(t−)− λxx˜k(t−)
)
y˜k(t) =y˜k(t−)+
+α
(
My(t−) + λymy(t−)
Mx(t−) + λxmx(t−)
λxx˜k(t−)− λy y˜k(t−)
)
.
(2.18)
Similar expressions for the updated quantities of goods
have been obtained in [12] by resorting to the binary ex-
change rule provided by the Hedgeworth box, and subse-
quently linearizing the outcome. We will be back to this
analogy later on.
III. A BOLTZMANN SYSTEM FOR TRADING
OF GOODS
A. The kinetic model
The previous model will be now modelled within the
principles of statistical mechanics. Let the multi-agent
system under study be composed by the two classes of
agents of section II. Let f(x, y, t) denote the density of
agents of the class A (the dealers) with quantities x and
y of the two goods at time t ≥ 0, and let g(x, y, t) de-
note the density of agents of the class B (the speculators)
with quantities x and y of the two goods at time t ≥ 0.
4As before, and without loss of generality, we will assume
that x and y are nonnegative real numbers. A system of
Boltzmann-like equations of Maxwell type for the time
evolution of the two densities f(x, y, t) and g(x, y, t) can
be written in terms of the updated quantities (2.17) and
(2.18) according to the following assumptions. The total
number of each good in the disposal of agents at time
t ≥ 0, previously given by (2.11) and (2.12) is here sub-
stituted by the mean values of the density functions at
time t ≥ 0
Mx(t) =
∫
R+
x f(x, y, t) dx dy,
My(t) =
∫
R+
y f(x, y, t) dx dy,
(3.19)
and
mx(t) =
∫
R+
x g(x, y, t) dx dy,
my(t) =
∫
R+
y g(x, y, t) dx dy.
(3.20)
We remark that this weaker assumption on the amount of
goods effectively present in the market appears realistic,
and it is consistent with the fact that agents in the mar-
ket have an exact perception of the quantities of goods
only in terms of their mean values. Moreover, to take
into account that it is very difficult to exchange goods by
performing an optimal exchange, we allow the updating
of goods to be dependent of some randomness expressing
deviation from the optimal choice, in any case by main-
taining optimality in mean sense. In agreement with [12]
this can be done by taking the values 0 ≤ α(ω) ≤ 1 and
0 ≤ β(ω) ≤ 1 in the updated quantities (2.17) and (2.18)
as positive independent random variables such that
〈α(ω)〉 = α, 〈β(ω)〉 = β, α+ β = 1, (3.21)
where 〈·〉 denotes mathematical expectation.
In reason of these choices, given a quantity (x, y) of
goods at time t ≥ 0, the dealers will update their quan-
tities according to
x∗ = x+ β(ω)
(
Mx(t) + λxmx(t)
My(t) + λymy(t)
y − x
)
y∗ = y + α(ω)
(
My(t) + λymy(t)
Mx(t) + λxmx(t)
x− y
)
.
(3.22)
Likewise, the speculators will update at time t ≥ 0 the
quantities (x, y) according to
x˜∗ = x+ β(ω)
(
Mx(t) + λxmx(t)
My(t) + λymy(t)
λy y − λx x
)
y˜∗ = y + α(ω)
(
My(t) + λymy(t)
Mx(t) + λxmx(t)
λx x− λy y
)
.
(3.23)
Note that the law of variation of the goods in disposal at
time t > 0 depends on the mean values of the densities
of the two groups at the same time.
In agreement with definition (2.16), the mean price
P (t) at time t ≥ 0 of the second good relative to the first
one is defined by
P (t) =
β
α
Mx(t) + λxmx(t)
My(t) + λymy(t)
. (3.24)
It is immediate to recognize that both interactions of type
(3.22) and (3.23) imply the conservation in the mean, at
each time t ≥ 0, of the agent’s wealths. Indeed
w∗A(t) =x
∗ + P (t)y∗ =
x+ P (t)y +
(
β(ω)− β
α
α(ω)
)(
α
β
P (t)y − x
)
,
w˜∗B(t) =x˜
∗ + P (t)y˜∗ = x˜+ P (t)y˜+
+
(
β(ω)− β
α
α(ω)
)(
α
β
P (t)λyy − λxx
)
,
(3.25)
which implies
〈w∗A(t)〉 = x+ P (t)y = wA(t),
〈w˜∗B(t)〉 = x+ P (t)y = wB(t).
(3.26)
Once the mechanism of variation of the quantities of
goods has been defined, the evolution in time of the den-
sities can be easily written down by expressing the law
of variation in time of the observable quantities. It cor-
responds to write, for any given smooth function ϕ, a
system of linear spatially homogeneous Boltzmann equa-
tions
d
dt
∫
R2+
ϕ(x, y)f(x, y, t) dx dy =
σ
〈∫
R2+
(ϕ(x∗, y∗)− ϕ(x, y))f(x, y, t) dx dy
〉
,
d
dt
∫
R2+
ϕ(x, y)g(x, y, t) dx dy =
σ
〈∫
R2+
(ϕ(x˜∗, y˜∗)− ϕ(x, y))g(x, y, t) dx dy
〉
.
(3.27)
In (3.27) the positive constant σ is a measure of the fre-
quency of interactions. The right-hand sides of equations
(3.27) describe the change of density f due the variation
of type (3.22) (respectively the change of g due the vari-
ation of type (3.23)). The two kinetic equations in (3.27)
are linked each other in view of the nature of the mi-
croscopic interactions, which involve the mean values of
both densities. By choosing ϕ(x, y) = x (respectively
ϕ(x, y) = y) one reckons the laws of variation in time of
the mean values (3.19) and (3.20) relative to the popula-
tions of dealers and speculators. The mean values of the
population of dealers change according to
dMx(t)
dt
= β
(
Mx(t) + λxmx(t)
My(t) + λymy(t)
My(t)−Mx(t)
)
,
dMy(t)
dt
= α
(
My(t) + λymy(t)
Mx(t) + λxmx(t)
Mx(t)−My(t)
)
.
(3.28)
5Likewise, the mean values of the population of specula-
tors change according to
dmx(t)
dt
= β
(
Mx(t) + λxmx(t)
My(t) + λymy(t)
λymy(t)− λxmx(t)
)
,
dmy(t)
dt
= α
(
My(t) + λymy(t)
Mx(t) + λxmx(t)
λxmx(t)− λymy(t)
)
.
(3.29)
It is immediate to recognize that
Mx(t) +mx(t) = Ix = Mx(0) +mx(0),
My(t) +my(t) = Iy = My(0) +my(0).
(3.30)
These constraints reflect the conservation of the mean
quantities of goods present in the closed market. Also,
in view of (3.26) it holds
d
dt
WA(t) = My(t)
d
dt
P (t),
d
dt
WB(t) = my(t)
d
dt
P (t).
(3.31)
Equations (3.31) express the time variation of the mean
wealths of the agents of classes A and B, in terms of the
evolution of the price.
Remark III.1 It is interesting to remark that, provided
that both the saving constants λx, λy are strictly positive,
we have a further conservation law. Thanks to (3.30)
Mx(t) + λxmx(t) = Ix − (1− λx)mx(t),
My(t) + λymy(t) = Iy − (1− λy)my(t). (3.32)
A further conservation follows considering that, if for any
given r > 0
Φx(r) =
1
β(1− λx) log [Ix − (1− λx)r], (3.33)
it holds
− dΦx(mx(t))
dt
= −Φ′x(mx(t))
dmx(t)
dt
=
+
1
β [Ix − (1− λx)mx(t)]
dmx(t)
dt
=
λymy(t)
Iy − (1− λy)my(t) −
λxmx(t)
Ix − (1− λx)mx(t) .
(3.34)
In analogous way, if
Φy(r) =
1
α(1− λy) log [Iy − (1− λy)r], (3.35)
it holds
−dΦy(my(t))
dt
=
λxmx(t)
Ix − (1− λx)mx(t)−
λymy(t)
Iy − (1− λy)my(t)
(3.36)
Consequently
d [Φx(mx(t)) + Φy(my(t))]
dt
= 0,
which implies the conservation law
(Ix − (1− λx)mx(t))1/[β(1−λx)] ·
· (Iy − (1− λy)my(t))1/[α(1−λy)] = C0,
(3.37)
Since the laws of evolution (3.28) and (3.29) are nonlin-
ear, even in presence of conservation laws, a precise an-
alytical study of systems (3.28) and (3.29) appears very
difficult. Likewise, it is cumbersome to find the evolu-
tion of the higher moments of the solutions to (3.27) in a
closed form. Hence, the Boltmann equation (3.27) is the
starting point for a numerical study of the evolution of
the densities by means of Monte Carlo methods [10, 16].
B. An explicitly solvable case
In what follows, we will discuss the situation in which
the agents of the class B will trade on the closed market
only goods of one type, say Y , with the intent to increase
their quantity of goods of type X. This corresponds to
choose λx = 0, and λy = δ. The simplest case is ob-
tained when λy = 1, namely the case in which agents of
the second class will exchange into the marked the total
amount of their goods of type Y .
If this is the case, the second equation in (3.29) reduces
to
dmy(t)
dt
= −αmy(t), (3.38)
which can be easily solved to give
my(t) = my(0) exp{−αt}. (3.39)
This shows that the goods of type Y in the hands of the
class B of agents is exponentially decreasing in time at a
rate proportional to α, and the class B will remain only
with goods of type Y .
Then, owing to the conservations (3.30) the first equa-
tion in (3.28) takes the form
dMx(t)
dt
=β
(
Mx(t)
My(t) +my(t)
My(t)−Mx(t)
)
=
−βMx(t)my(t)
Iy
.
(3.40)
Hence we have
d logMx(t)
dt
= −βmy(0)
Iy
exp{−αt}, (3.41)
that can be integrated to give
Mx(t) = Mx(0) exp
{
−β
α
my(0)
Iy
(1− exp{−αt})
}
.
(3.42)
As expected, the quantity of goods of type X in the class
A of agents is decreasing in time, and will exponentially
reach the limit value
M¯x = Mx(0) exp
{
−β
α
my(0)
Iy
}
.
6Owing to the conservation laws (3.30), from (3.39) and
(3.42) we then obtain the values of mx(t) and My(t).
Also, the mean price P (t) defined in (3.24) is
P (t) =
β
α
Mx(0)
Iy
exp
{
−β
α
my(0)
Iy
(1− exp{−αt})
}
.
(3.43)
The price of the good Y relative to X is decreasing in
time, and it will reach the limit value
P¯ =
β
α
Mx(0)
Iy
exp
{
−β
α
my(0)
Iy
}
.
Note that in this case the time variation of the wealths
of the two classes, given by (3.31) is negative, and both
classes will show their wealths decrease in time.
Consider the case in which initially the two classes pos-
sess the same mean quantity of the good Y , but the class
A possesses a bigger mean quantity of the good X. Then,
at time t = 0 one has WA(0) > WB(0). Since the class
B is transferring goods of type Y to the class A, at any
subsequent time t > 0 the difference My(t)−my(t) is pos-
itive, and the relative wealth WA(t) −WB(t), in reason
of (3.31) is decreasing in time. In this case, the strategy
of the agents of the class B is such that its final wealth
is closer to the wealth of the class A.
The previous example shows that the eventual strat-
egy of the agents of the class B is able to determine an
effective improvement of their wealth conditions.
C. The general case
Let us set
ρx(t) =
Mx(t)
Mx(t) + λxmx(t)
,
ρy(t) =
My(t)
My(t) + λymy(t)
.
(3.44)
Then, equations (3.28) can be rewritten as
1
Mx(t) + λxmx(t)
dMx(t)
dt
= β (ρy(t)− ρx(t)) ,
1
My(t) + λymy(t)
dMy(t)
dt
= α (ρx(t)− ρy(t)) .
(3.45)
Using the constraints (3.30) it follows that
dρx(t)
dt
=
λxIx
(λxIx + (1− λx)Mx(t))2
dMx(t)
dt
, (3.46)
and analogous result (changing x with y) for ρy(t).
Hence, since (3.44) imply
λxIx
λxIx + (1− λx)Mx(t) = 1− (1− λx)ρx, (3.47)
equations (3.45) take the form
dρx(t)
dt
= β(1− (1− λx)ρx(t)) (ρy(t)− ρx(t)) ,
dρy(t)
dt
= α(1− (1− λy)ρy(t)) (ρx(t)− ρy(t)) .
(3.48)
It is clear that the equilibrium points of system (3.48)
are obtained when ρx = ρy. on the other hand, the
conservation law (3.37) implies that, in equilibrium the
function
H(ρx(t), ρy(t)) = ((1− (1− λx)ρx(t)))1/β(1−λx) ·
((1− (1− λy)ρx(t)))1/α(1−λx)
(3.49)
satisfies the identity
H(ρx, ρy) = H(ρx, ρx) = H(ρ¯x, ρ¯y), (3.50)
where ρ¯x, ρ¯y denote the initial values. Since the function
H = H(u, v) is decreasing with respect to both u and v
when 0 < u, v < 1, whenever ρ¯ = min{ρ¯x, ρ¯y}
H(ρ¯x, ρ¯y) ≥ H(ρ¯, ρ¯).
Hence, there is a unique equilibrium point ρ with
min{ρ¯x, ρ¯y} ≤ ρ ≤ max{ρ¯x, ρ¯y} in which
H(ρ, ρ) = H(ρ¯x, ρ¯y).
In correspondence to this equilibrium point, we obtain
the limit value of the price
P¯ =
βλxIx
αλyIy
1− (1− λy)ρ
1− (1− λx)ρ . (3.51)
IV. A SYSTEM OF NONLINEAR BOLTZMANN
EQUATIONS
The basic model discussed in Section III can be eas-
ily adapted to recover a microscopic binary interaction
between agents of the same class, or between agents of
different classes.
For simplicity, let us start as in Section II by consid-
ering a market with a number N of agents which possess
goods of two different types X and Y . Consider now at
time t a trading between two agents with wealths wj(t)
and wk(t) given respectively by
wj(t) = xj(t−) + P (t)yj(t−),
wk(t) = xk(t−) + P (t)yk(t−).
(4.52)
Then, both agents determine a fractions of their wealths
to allocate the good X, with the reminder allocated to
the good Y . Using again the Cobb-Douglas utility func-
tion (2.4) agents will update the quantities of goods to
xj(t) = αwj(t), P (t)yj(t) = βwj(t),
xk(t) = αwk(t), P (t)yk(t) = βwk(t).
(4.53)
7At difference with the previous (global) analysis of the
closed market, the value of the price P (t) is now deter-
mined from the values of the variables at time t−∆t by
resorting to the constraints of conservation of the sums
of goods of type X and Y of the two agents j and k. In
this case
α(wj(t) + wk(t)) = xj(t−) + xk(t−),
β(wj(t) + wk(t)) = Pk(t)(yj(t−) + yk(t−)).
(4.54)
Hence, solving for P (t) we obtain the relation
P (t) =
β
α
xj(t−) + xk(t−)
yj(t−) + yk(t−)
. (4.55)
Substituting the expression for P (t) back into (2.5) leads
for the agent j to the new quantities of goods
xj(t) = xj(t−) + β
(
xj(t−) + xk(t−)
yj(t−) + yk(t−)
yj(t−)− xj(t−)
)
yj(t) = yj(t−) + α
(
yj(t−) + yk(t−)
xj(t−) + xk(t−)
xj(t−)− yj(t−)
)
.
(4.56)
Analogous result holds for the updating of the quantities
of goods of the agent k.
This binary exchange can be easily generalized to the
two groups of dealers and speculators considered before.
In a binary exchange between the dealer j of the class A
and the speculator k of the class B, the dealer j updates
its goods according to
xj(t) = xj(t−) + β
(
xj(t−) + λxxk(t−)
yj(t−) + λyyk(t−)
yj(t−)− xj(t−)
)
,
yj(t) = yj(t−) + α
(
yj(t−) + λyyk(t−)
xj(t−) + λxxk(t−)
xj(t−)− yj(t−)
)
.
(4.57)
Likewise, a speculator k updates its quantities of goods
according to
xk(t) =xk(t−)+
+β
(
xj(t−) + λxxk(t−)
yj(t−) + λyyk(t−)
λyyk(t−)− λxxk(t−)
)
,
yk(t) =yk(t−)+
+α
(
yj(t−) + λyyk(t−)
xj(t−) + λxxk(t−)
λkxk(t−)− λyyk(t−)
)
.
(4.58)
We remark that similar expressions for the updated quan-
tities of goods have been obtained in [12] by resorting to
the binary exchange rule provided by the Hedgeworth
box. Similarly to the model considered of [12] we can use
the binary exchanges (4.56) , (4.57) and (4.58) to con-
struct a system of bilinear Boltzmann type equations.
We assume that the dealers can interact with other
dealers, and with speculators, according to their respec-
tive rules (4.56) and (4.57), while speculators interact
only with dealers, according to (4.58). As before, let
f(x, y, t) denote the density of dealers of the class A with
quantities x and y of the two goods at time t ≥ 0, and let
g(x, y, t) denote the density of speculators of the class B
with quantities x and y of the two goods at time t ≥ 0.
Then f(x, y, t) satisfies
d
dt
∫
R2+
ϕ(x, y)f(x, y, t) dx dy =
σ
∫
R2+
ϕ(x, y)Q(f, f)(x, y) dxdy+
+µ
∫
R2+
ϕ(x, y)P (f, g)(x, y) dxdy.
(4.59)
The constants σ and ν measure the frequency of colli-
sions. The right-hand side of equation (3.27) describes
the change of density due to exchanges between dealers
(the operator Q) and exchanges dealer–speculator (the
operator P ). The definitions of Q and P are fruitfully
given by their action on observable quantities∫
R2+
ϕ(x, y)Q(f, f)(x, y) dxdy =〈∫
R4+
(ϕ(x∗, y∗)− ϕ(x, y))f(x, y, t)f(x1, y1, t) dpi
〉
,
(4.60)
where, now and later on, dpi = dx dy dx1 dy1, and
x∗ = x+ β(ω)
(
x+ x1
y + y1
y − x
)
,
y∗ = y + α(ω)
(
y + y1
x+ x1
x− y
)
.
(4.61)
Likewise∫
R2+
ϕ(x, y)P (f, g)(x, y) dxdy =〈∫
R4+
(ϕ(x˜, y˜)− ϕ(x, y))f(x, y, t)g(x1, y1, t) dpi
〉
,
(4.62)
where
x˜ = x+ β(ω)
(
x+ λxx1
y + λyy1
y − x
)
,
y˜ = y + α(ω)
(
y + λyy1
x+ λxx1
x− y
)
.
(4.63)
In agreement with Section III the values 0 ≤ α(ω) ≤ 1
and 0 ≤ β(ω) ≤ 1 in (4.61) and (4.63) are positive in-
dependent random variables satisfying (3.21). Equation
(4.59) is coupled with the evolution equation for g(x, y, t),
given by
d
dt
∫
R2+
ϕ(x, y)f(x, y, t) dx dy =
µ
∫
R2+
ϕ(x, y)P¯ (g, f)(x, y) dxdy.
(4.64)
8Clearly∫
R2+
ϕ(x, y)P¯ (g, f)(x, y) dxdy =
〈∫
R4+
dx dy dx1 dy1
(ϕ(x¯, y¯)− ϕ(x, y))g(x, y, t)f(x1, y1, t) 〉 ,
(4.65)
where
x¯ = x+ β(ω)
(
x1 + λxx
y1 + λyy
λyy − λxx
)
,
y˜ = y + α(ω)
(
y1 + λyy
x1 + λxx
λxx− λyy
)
.
(4.66)
Note that, denoting
x∗1 = x1 + β(ω)
(
x+ x1
y + y1
y1 − x1
)
,
y∗1 = y1 + α(ω)
(
y + y1
x+ x1
x1 − y1
)
.
(4.67)
exchanging variables into the integral one has the identity〈∫
R4+
(x∗ − x)f(x, y, t)f(x1, y1, t) dpi
〉
=
1
2
〈∫
R4+
(x∗ + x∗1 − x− x1)f(x, y, t)f(x1, y1, t) dpi
〉
= 0.
This property is not satisfied by the mixed operators
P (f.g) and P¯ (g, f). However it can be easily verified
that∫
R2+
xP (f, g)(x, y) dxdy +
∫
R2+
xP¯ (g, f)(x, y) dxdy = 0.
The same properties hold if we substitute the good x
with the good y. This implies that the conservation of
the mean values, as given by (3.30) still hold for the non-
linear system . Since the exchanges of goods of type
(3.23) are nonlinear, the study of the properties of the
solution to the Boltzmann system appears difficult. The
Boltmann system (4.59), (4.64) can however be studied
from a numerical point of view.
V. NUMERICAL EXPERIMENTS
This section contains a numerical description of the
solutions to the nonlinear Boltzmann system (4.59) and
(4.64). For the numerical approximation of the Boltz-
mann equations we apply a Monte Carlo method, as
described in Chapter 4 of [2]. If not otherwise stated
the kinetic simulation has been performed with N = 104
agents.
The numerical experiments will help to clarify the ef-
fect of the strategy of speculators in the final distribution
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FIG. 5.1: α = 0.5;β = 0.5;Mx = 3;mx = 10;My = 3;my =
2;λx = 0.8;λy = 0.2 (left); α = 0.5;β = 0.5;Mx = 3;mx =
10;My = 3;my = 2;λx = 0.5;λy = 0.5 (right).
of the wealth density among the two classes of agents.
It is evident from the experiments that, thanks to the
conservations of the mean quantities of the goods, the
densities f(x, y, t) of dealers and g(x, y, t) of speculators
will converge to stationary distributions [2]. As usual in
kinetic theory, these stationary solutions will be reached
in an exponentially fast time. We will evaluate the sta-
tionary solutions for different values of the parameters
λx, λy and different values of the parameters α and β. In
this way we will recognize first the effect of the strategy
of speculators and, second, the role of the preferences pa-
rameters α and β to reach the final distribution of wealth.
The main test represents a two-phases experiment. In
the first phase, the convergence of the price to its equilib-
rium value is shown by considering only the population
of dealers. Then, when the price is close to its equilib-
rium value, the speculators enter into the game to modify
the price value. At difference with the linear model de-
scribed in Section III, where in absence of the population
of speculators the price of the goods in possess of the pop-
ulation of dealers takes a constant value, the nonlinear
model exhibits oscillations in the price evolution, which
reduce exponentially in time.
The test is intended to simulate the situation in which
a small number of speculators are entering into the mar-
ket to obtain a marked advantage in their wealth by a
saving politics. Since the price of the goods is adapting
exponentially fast in time, the experiment also justifies
the fact that dealers have no time to adapt to the new
situation by changing their preferences.
The test is performed for different values of the relevant
parameters α, β, λx and λy, to clarify their effect on the
price evolution.
Figure 5.1 shows the variation of the (relative) price of
the second good induced by the strategy of speculators.
When the saving parameters λx and λy are such that
λx > λy, the price of the good Y is shown to increase
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FIG. 5.2: α = 0.25;β = 0.75;Mx = 3;mx = 10;My =
3;my = 2;λx = 0.8;λy = 0.2 (left); α = 0.75;β = 0.25;Mx =
3;mx = 10;My = 3;my = 2;λx = 0.5;λy = 0.5 (right).
(left). On the contrary, by taking the saving parameters
equal, and by leaving the other quantities unchanged,
the price of the good Y is shown to increase (left). Note
that in both cases the value of the price consequent to
the action of the speculators decays exponentially fast
towards the limit value.
Figure 5.2 shows the variation of the (relative) price of
the second good induced by the strategy of speculators in
presence of a radical change of the preference parameters
α and β. All the remaining parameters are left equal.
While both experiments lead to a positive variation of
the (relative) price of the second good, the final price in
the two experiments is completely different. While in the
case to the left, denoted by a marked preference for the
good Y , the price of this good stabilizes around a value
between 3 and 3.5, in the case to the right, characterized
by a marked preference for the good X, the price of the
good y stabilizes around a value 0.35, namely a factor
ten below the prive of the experiment on the left.
Last, Figure 5.3 shows the evolution of price in the
case of different choices of the saving parameters, cou-
pled with different mean quantities of goods. As in the
case of Figure 5.1 the relevant parameters which allow
to increase (or decrease the final relative price of good Y
seem to be the saving parameters λx and λy.
VI. FINAL REMARKS
In this paper we introduced two systems of kinetic
equations of Boltzmann type suitable to describe the evo-
lution of the probability distribution of two goods among
two populations of agents, dealers and speculators, that
apply different strategies in the exchanges. The leading
idea was to describe the trading of these goods by means
of some fundamental rules in prize theory, in particular
by using Cobb-Douglas utility functions for the binary
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FIG. 5.3: α = 0.5;β = 0.5;Mx = 3;mx = 20;My =
7, 5;my = 5;λx = 0.8;λy = 0.2 (left); α = 0.5;β = 0.5;Mx =
3;mx = 7.5;My = 20;my = 5;λx = 0.2;λy = 0.8 (right).
exchange. Also, to take into account the intrinsic risks of
the market, we introduced randomness in the exchange,
without affecting the microscopic conservations, that is
the conservation of the total number of each good in the
market.
Both the analytic study of the linear system (3.27), and
the numerical simulation of the nonlinear system (4.59)
and (4.64) allow to conclude that the saving politics of
the speculators is able to modify the final price of the
goods, to achieve eventually a net gain.
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